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1 Introduction
Governments have dramatically reduced their scope over the last 20 years. European
member states have accepted opening their utilities to EU competitors, which generally
implied both deregulating and privatizing several national monopolies. Similarly many
former communist countries have implemented massive privatization programs to restruc-
ture their economies. Finally the liberalization and privatization movement has occurred
in other OECD countries and in many developing countries, generally as part of struc-
tural adjustment programs. Economists have undertaken a substantial amount of work
to analyze the cost and benefit of the reforms. A consensus emerges that privatization
tends to improve firms’ performance so that public ownership/provision is generally sub-
optimal in competitive industries. However, in increasing returns to scale industries, the
efficiency gains of privatization are not necessarily transmitted to consumers.4 Moving
from public to private ownership does not offer a solution to the lack of competition that
prevails in sectors such as infrastructure, water and waste management, public transport,
mail services, information and communications technology services. Nevertheless the UK,
Australia, New Zealand, and to a lesser extent the US, have adopted competitive tender-
ing and outsourcing in many segments of those industries.5 This raises the question about
the economic rationale for government to contract out in non-competitive markets.
This paper aims to address this question by focusing on government’s monitoring of
natural monopoly, for which regulation is usually recommended. Government outsourcing
is defined as the combination of a transfer of control and cash-flow rights to a private firm
and of the possibility of government offering ex-post contracts to it. The paper presents
the properties of the optimal ex-post contracts and compares the welfare obtained under
4For instance the 5% fall in total generation costs, that is attributed to the UK electricity privatization
program, has (at least) initially been captured by the private shareholders (see Newbery and Pollitt 1997).
5In the UK, Kable (2006) estimates that the market for public sector outsourcing during the years
2005 and 2006 has reached 49.4 billions of pounds and is expected to grow by 30% over the next three
years to reach an annual spend of 64.3 billions of pounds. Similarly the average American city contracts
out almost a quarter of its common municipal services to the private sector, while the average American
state contracts out 14% of its activities (Savas 2005).
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regulation and outsourcing. It shows that the outsourcing policy is often better than
regulation, even under the ideal assumption that a benevolent government is able to
commit to a set of complete contracts.
In the regulation regime, which is based on Baron and Myerson’s (1982) model, the
utilitarian government decides to set up a regulated firm run by a manager who benefits
from private information about the firm’s cost. The government has control and cash-
flow rights over the regulated firm. It controls the investment and production decisions
and is therefore accountable for the firm’s profits and losses. Such a combination of
control rights and accountability duties by the government is typical of public ownership.
Under asymmetric information, the government designs incentive contracts to entice the
firm’s manager to set the efficient level of production at some informational cost. In
the outsourcing regime, a private investor is invited to enter the market, possibly in
exchange for a franchise fee.6 The private investor gets the control and cash-flow rights
on the outsourced activity. He/she controls the investment and production decisions
and therefore is fully accountable for his/her profits and losses. As it is, the private
firm is allowed to set the laissez-faire monopoly prices. Yet, because laissez-faire is not
necessarily optimal, the government can improve welfare by offering ex-post contracts to
the private firm (i.e., once investment costs have been sunk and uncertainties have been
solved). To accept such ex-post contracts, the private investor must at least obtain his/her
laissez-faire profit. Technically this implies that the individual rationality constraint of
the private investor is type dependent.
The paper contribution is twofold. First of all, it characterizes the optimal outsourcing
contracts. In particular it shows that governments offer more selective contracts under
outsourcing than under regulation: high cost firms may indeed receive no ex-post con-
tracts. This result can be explained as follows. At the ex-post contracting stage, the
private firm knows its cost parameter whereas the government does not. If the govern-
ment chooses to contract with all types of firms, as it does in the regulation regime, then
6The franchise fee mights be the result of a competitive tendering or of a bargaining process between
the government and private investor (see section 5.3).
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incentive considerations apply and lead to a reduction of the output levels of high cost
firms. This strategy prevents low cost firms from inflating their cost reports (see Baron
and Myerson, 1982). Incentive issues can be so harsh that the output levels of high cost
firms become smaller than the output levels that they achieve as laissez-faire monopoly.
As a result, consumer surplus can be significantly reduced and the utilitarian govern-
ment is simply better off without contracting with high cost firms. Second, the paper
characterizes the necessary and sufficient condition under which outsourcing is preferred
to regulation. The benefit of outsourcing can be broken down into two effects. First,
outsourcing can generate a fiscal effect as the government is able to terminate subsidies
to money-losing projects and possibly also to collect a franchise fee from the private in-
vestor. Second, outsourcing can generate an economic surplus effect as production can be
higher under outsourcing than under regulation. When those two effects are large enough
outsourcing is optimal.
To assess the practical relevance of this analysis, the paper presents four particular
situations under which outsourcing is preferred to regulation. First, when the shadow
cost of public funds is small enough (as it is likely to be in advanced economies), out-
sourcing is optimal as soon as there exists a cost realization for which the firm makes a
loss. This occurs in sectors that involve large uncertainties such as high technologies and
R&D intensive industries. As an example, in OECD countries, legal drugs are supplied
with the help of partnerships between the public and the private sector. The type of con-
tractual arrangements existing for pharmaceutical products is very close from the ex-post
contractual arrangement described in the paper.
Second, when the cost of public funds is very large (as it can be in very poor countries),
the government puts much less weight on consumer surplus than on the transfers to and
from the firm. Outsourcing takes the extreme form of laissez-faire. The government
never offers an ex-post contract to the private firm whereas it runs the regulated firm
to maximize its tax proceeds. Outsourcing becomes optimal as soon as the franchise
fee paid by the private investor becomes larger than the expected tax proceeds on the
regulated firm. This result implies that poor countries should not use public ownership
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and regulation in less profitable market segments. For instance, the services used by Sub-
Saharan African low income populations are many times provided by privately owned,
unregulated (and informal) firms (see Auriol and Blanc, 2007).
Third, it is shown that outsourcing is optimal for any costs of public funds if the
government is able to obtain enough revenues with ex-ante franchise fees. Outsourcing is
hence better than regulation if the franchise fee is the result of a perfectly competitive
bidding or of an efficient bargaining process between the government and the private
investors. The conditions for efficient bargaining and competitive bidding are more likely
to be satisfied in advanced economies. For instance, this might offer an explanation about
the outsourcing policy of water management in large French cities.
Finally the paper proposes a full characterization of the outsourcing choice under lin-
ear demand functions and uniform cost distributions. This class of examples shows that
the set of economic parameters supporting the outsourcing decision is far from negligible.
It hence shows that outsourcing is more likely to dominate regulation for stronger techno-
logical uncertainty and for lower market profitability. Postal and transportation services
in low density areas are good candidates for such low profitability outsourcing contracts.
Related literature The paper relates to the existing literature in several ways. First
of all, it belongs to the traditional regulation literature initiated by Baron and Myerson’s
(1982) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1986) models of natural monopoly. However, contrary
to these earlier contributions, it does not postulate that regulation is optimal. Indeed
over the last 20 years many contributions have pointed out the drawbacks of public man-
agement. The literature on deregulation and optimal industry design under incomplete
information insists on the point that choosing an industry structure in increasing returns
to scale industries is not a trivial issue (see Auriol-Laffont, 1993; Dana and Spier, 1994;
McGuire and Riordan, 1995).
Second, the paper is related to the literature on privatization. This literature con-
siders that public firms are less efficient because governments lack economic orientation7
7For instance in Kornai and Weibull (1983), or in Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), governments
have ’parternalistic’ or political behavior as they seek to protect or increase employment; in Shapiro and
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and/or because they do not provide appropriate incentives to firm managers. In par-
ticular, because governments lack the commitment not to bail out money-losing firms,
public firms’ managers tend to undertake money-losing projects. By hardening the firm’s
budget constraint, privatization helps restoring appropriate investment incentives (see
Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Schmidt, 1996a and 1996b; Segal, 1998; Maskin, 1999).
This theory has provided support to the possibility of productivity improvements through
privatization reforms in transition economies and in the banking sector. Recent empirical
evidence has suggested that privatization indeed improves the internal efficiency of firms.8
However, this literature has not addressed the important issue of allocative inefficiencies
(price distortion) induced by privatization reforms in increasing returns to scale indus-
tries. Auriol and Picard (2008) is a first attempt to address the issue. Based on a linear
demand model with asymmetric information on cost, these authors show that regulation
of a natural monopoly can be dominated by laissez-faire for intermediate values of shadow
costs of public funds. The present paper significantly enriches this result by allowing for
a larger set of (ex-post) contracts, for a larger class of demand functions and for endoge-
nous franchise fees. The decision to outsource is then altered with respect to Auriol and
Picard (2008). In particular, ex-post contracting makes outsourcing desirable even for
small shadow costs of public firms. Furthermore the combination of ex-post contracting
and efficient bargaining over franchise fees always makes outsourcing a better policy than
regulation.9
Thirdly our model can be related to the literature on public-private partnerships (PPP)
that has merited recent attention in national and international funding institutions (see
Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000; IMF, 2004). The idea behind PPP is to make governments
Willig (1990), governments are malevolent.
8Megginson and Netter (2001) in their literature review covering 65 empirical studies (some at the
national level and some across countries) at the firm level conclude that in general private firms are more
productive and more profitable than their public counterparts.
9The present model differs from “soft budget constraint” models as it relies neither on governments’
lack of commitment nor on moral hazard. The model relies on the combination of adverse selection, firm’s
individual rationality constraint, and costly public funds. It nevertheless shares the same implication as
“soft budget constraint” models that suggest to cut the subsidies to unproductive firms.
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purchase the service rather than the asset that is associated with the provision of a public
good or of a good for which there is a potential market failure. On the one hand, PPPs
are seen by governments as a vehicle to shift investment costs off their books and/or to
safeguard the execution of projects that would otherwise hardly materialize given their
budget constraints. On the other hand, PPPs are praised for their potential benefits in
terms of productive efficiency.10
Finally the paper is related to the literature on mechanism design under type-dependent
reservation utility (see Lewis and Sappington, 1989; Jullien, 2000; Picard, 2001; and Laf-
font and Martimort 2002, Chap. 3). Indeed the possibility of ex-post contracting involves
type-dependent individual rationality constraint.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 and 4
characterize the optimal contracts under regulation and under outsourcing respectively.
Section 5 analyzes the conditions under which outsourcing yields a higher welfare than
regulation. Section 6 discusses the scope of the outsourcing contracts and some practical
examples of outsourcing. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The government has to decide whether a natural monopoly should be operated under
public or private management. In line with Laffont and Tirole (1993), we call regulation
regime the regime in which the government has control and cash-flow rights over a regulated
firm. As it is standard in the regulation literature the government’s control rights are
associated with accountability on profits and losses. That is, it subsidizes the regulated
firm in case of losses whereas it taxes it in case of profits. Such a combination of control
rights and accountability duties by public authorities is typical of public ownership. In
contrast, we call outsourcing the regime in which a private unregulated firm produce
the commodity. Under outsourcing, control and cash-flow rights belong to a private
10Public-private partnerships (PPP) can be used to harden the firms’ budget constraints as we discussed
earlier and can be used to bundle complementary tasks such as the construction and the operation of
infrastructure projects (see Hart 2003, Martimort and Pouyet 2006, Iossa and Martimort 2007).
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investor or, namely, a private firm. The government takes no responsibility for the firm’s
profits and losses. It can nevertheless ask the potential producer to pay a franchise fee
for the right to operate as a monopoly. Moreover the government can contract ex-post
with the firm to increase the supply of the commodity. We refer to this situation as
ex-post contracting. When the government offers no ex-post contracts, the firm chooses
the laissez-faire production level.
The paper focuses on natural monopoly. The firm needs to sink a fixed investment
cost K > 0 before the production period.11 To focus on the allocative efficiency problem
and to keep the analysis simple, we assume that the investment cost K is constant and is
verifiable.12 The uncertainty lies on the impact of the investment on the technology. That
is, after the investment stage, the firm incurs an idiosyncratic marginal cost β to produce
the output in quantity Q. We assume that the marginal cost β is independently drawn
from the support [β, β¯] according to the density and cumulative distribution functions
g(·) and G(·). The expectation operator is denoted E so that E [h(β)] = ∫ β¯
β
h(β)dG(β).
For example, β captures the uncertainty inherent to a R&D project. A larger variance
corresponds to a more risky project. In the sequel, the terms ’ex-post’ and ’ex-ante’
correspond to the period before and after the realization of β.
To summarize, the firm cost function is as in Baron and Myerson (1982)
C(β,Q) = K + βQ
where K is known in advance while β is random.
Consumers are characterized by a decreasing inverse demand function, denoted P (Q).
The gross surplus associated with the consumption of Q units of the commodity is defined
as S(Q) =
∫ Q
0
P (x)dx. We focus on a commodity that generates a large enough surplus
so that shutting down production is never optimal. Technically the willingness to pay
11This investment cost corresponds to the construction cost in infrastructure or utility projects (e.g.,
power plant, highway, water distribution network) or to research and development costs in projects like
public health (e.g., a new medicine) or major ICT services for administrations (e.g., payroll management).
12This assumption simplifies the analysis by ruling out moral hazard issue about the optimal size of
investment. For an analysis of the moral hazard issue see for instance Dewattripont and Maskin (1995).
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for the first unit of the good must be sufficiently large. This is formally stated in the
following assumption:
A1 P (0) > β +G(β)/g(β)
Under assumption A1, public and private firms are always able to make a positive
margin. Since investment costs are sunk, firms never shut down production. The firm’s
profit in the absence of public transfer is equal to P (Q)Q − βQ − K. The firm’s profit
with public transfer is equal to
Π (β,Q, t, F ) = P (Q)Q− βQ−K + t− F (1)
where t is the ex-post transfer that the firm gets from the government and where F is a
possible ex-ante franchise fee paid to the government. The transfer to the firm can either
be positive (i.e., a subsidy), or negative (a tax).
As in Laffont and Tirole (1993), the government is benevolent and utilitarian. It maxi-
mizes the sum of consumer’s and producer’s surpluses minus the social cost of transferring
public funds to the firm. The government’s objective function is
W (β,Q, t, F, λ) = S(Q)− βQ−K − λt+ λF (2)
where λ is the shadow cost of public funds.
The shadow cost of public funds, λ, drives the results of the paper. This shadow cost,
which can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint,
measures the social cost of the government’s economic intervention. For λ close to 0, the
government maximizes the net consumer surplus; for larger λ, the government puts more
weight on the social cost of transfers. The shadow cost of public funds is positive because
transfers to regulated firms imply either a decrease in the production of public goods, such
as schooling and health care, or an increase in distortionary taxation. Each euro that is
transferred to the regulated firm costs 1+λ euros to society. In developed economies, λ is
mainly equal to the deadweight loss accrued to imperfect income taxation. It is assessed
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to be around 0.3 (Snower and Warren, 1996).13 In developing countries, low income levels
and difficulties in implementing effective taxation programs are strong constraints on the
government’s budget, which leads to higher values of λ. In particular, the value is very
high in countries close to financial bankruptcy. To fix idea the World Bank (1998) suggests
a shadow cost of 0.9.
We next compare regulation and outsourcing in the benchmark case of symmetric
information between the firms and the government.
3 Symmetric Information
The timing under regulation is as follows. The government firstly decides whether or not
to invest K; if K is sunk, nature chooses the marginal cost β according to the distribution
function G(·); the regulated firm’s manager and the government learn β; the government
proposes a production and transfer scheme (Qr(·), tr(·)). Because there is no ex-ante
transfer of ownership under regulation, there is no payment of franchise fee F . Under
symmetric information the government maximizes the utilitarian welfare function:
max
{Q(·),t(·)}
EW = E [S(Q (β))− βQ (β)−K − λt (β)]
subject to the public manager’s participation constraint: Π [β,Q (β) , t (β) , 0] = 0. Point-
wise maximization yields the following first order condition for Qr(β):
P (Q) +
λ
1 + λ
P ′(Q)Q = β (3)
13The shadow cost of public funds λ reflects the macro-economic constraints that are imposed on
national governments’ surpluses and debts levels by supranational institutions (e.g. by the Maastricht
treaty on E.U. member states, by the I.M.F. on many developing countries). The shadow cost of public
funds also reflects micro-economic constraints of government agencies that are unable to commit to
long-term investment expenditures in their annual or pluri-annual budgets. In the context of private-
public-partnership, the shadow cost of public funds reflects the short term opportunity gain to record
infrastructure assets out of the government’s book.
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The transfer is equal to tr(β) = −P (Qr)Qr+βQr+K. The government subsidizes money-
losing firms if tr > 0 and it taxes profit-making firms if tr < 0. Ex-ante welfare writes as
EW r = E[S(Qr) +λP (Qr)Qr −(1 + λ)βQr −(1 + λ)K].
Under outsourcing, the timing is as follows. First, a private investor chooses to enter
the market by paying the franchise fee F and by investing K. If the private firm en-
ters, then nature chooses the marginal cost β according to the distribution G(·). Under
symmetric information the private firm’s manager and the government learn β. The gov-
ernment then proposes a set of contracts {to(·), Qo(·)}. The firm either chooses to pick a
contract and to implement its terms, or it chooses not to contract with the government in
which case it sets its production at the laissez-faire monopoly level. Production, exchange
and transfer occur as agreed upon.
Once entered, the firm’s fallback position is the laissez-faire equilibrium. After the
realization of β, the private monopoly maximizes its variable profit (P (Q) − β)Q. The
first order condition yields the laissez-faire monopoly levels of production Qm (β), which
solves
P (Q) + P ′(Q)Q = β. (4)
We denote
Πm(β) = [P (Qm(β))− βQm(β)]−K (5)
the monopoly profit. Since it is not optimal to let private monopoly operate at the laissez-
faire level, the government can offer ex-post transfers to correct the monopoly price.
After the cost realization, the government proposes an ex-post contract that maximizes
EW = E [S(Q (β))− βQ (β)−K − λt (β)] subject to the participation constraint of the
private owner: (P (Q)−β)Q+t (β) ≥ (P (Qm)−β)Qm. The reservation profit of the private
owner is equal to his/her laissez-faire profit, which is type dependent and decreases with
marginal cost β. However, the reservation profit is independent of the output Q chosen by
the government. As a consequence, the outsourcing government chooses an output level
that is exactly equal to the output under regulation: Qo(β) = Qr(β). Regulation and
outsourcing then differ only in term of transfers given to the firm. Under outsourcing, the
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government gives the smallest transfer that satisfies the participation constraint of the
private owner. The transfer can be computed as to = (P (Qm)− β)Qm −(P (Qr)− β)Qr,
which simply reimburses the difference between the (variable) profits under laissez-faire
and regulation. Because Qm is the maximizer of the firm’s variable profit, the transfer
to is positive for any cost realization β. Finally, since the private owner just gets his/her
ex-post reservation (variable) profit (P (Qm) − β)Qm, he/she values his/her entry in the
business to EΠm − F = E [(P (Qm)− β)Qm]−K − F .
Before the cost realization, the risk neutral private investor accepts to pay the franchise
fee F if and only if EΠm − F ≥ 0. Given that Qo = Qr, the ex-ante welfare under
outsourcing is then equal to EW o = E{S(Qr) +λP (Qr)Qr −(1+λ)βQr −K −λ(P (Qm)−
β)Qm + λF}. Outsourcing yields a larger ex-ante welfare than regulation if and only if
EW o ≥ EW r. This is equivalent to
λ[K − (P (Qm)− β)Qm + F ] ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ λ (F − EΠm) ≥ 0. (6)
The cost and benefit of outsourcing can be broken down into the three basic elements
that distinguish it from regulation: timing, outside option and franchise fee.14 First, by
allowing the firm to make the investment and to become its residual claimant, the govern-
ment saves on the social cost of the investment λK. Second, by contracting ex-post with
the private firm and by allowing it to earn a monopoly laissez-faire rent, the government
constrains itself on the possible ex-post revenues it can tap from it. This has a social cost
equal to λ(P (Qm)− β)Qm. Finally, the government is able to recoup ex-ante a franchise
fee, which has a social benefit equal to λF . Adding these three elements together, the
reader readily observes that the social net benefit of outsourcing is proportional to the
ex-ante loss of the private firm F − EΠm. Therefore, under symmetric information, the
government and the private firm cannot simultaneously gain from outsourcing. Outsourc-
ing is at best equivalent to regulation either if the shadow cost of public funds λ is zero
or if the government is able to tap the whole ex-ante surplus profit through the franchise
fee. We collect this result in the following proposition.
14We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this useful decomposition.
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Proposition 1 Under symmetric information, outsourcing does not yield a higher welfare
than regulation.
Proposition 1 is a reminiscence of the standard result in regulation theory stating
that a benevolent and fully informed government cannot perform worse than the market
since it is always able to replicate the market outcome. The above proposition goes
behind this statement: the regulated firm does not perform worse than the market even
though the government has instruments to correct ex-post the possible price distortions
under outsourcing. The next section shows that this result is not robust under the more
realistic assumption of asymmetric information.
4 Asymmetric Information
Under asymmetric information, the government is not able to acquire the information
about firms’ cost conditions. The timing of regulation and outsourcing is the same as
in Section 3 except that cost realization β is now the firms’ private information. The
government proposes a contract that entices firms to reveal their private information. We
sequentially discuss the cases of regulation and outsourcing, whose variables will also be
denoted by superscripts r and o without risk of confusion. The analysis of regulation
replicates the standard mechanism design literature as it is presented in Baron and Myer-
son (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1993). The analysis of outsourcing is somewhat more
interesting as it involves the design of incentive contracts under type-varying participation
constraint. A consequence of this peculiarity is that some firms are not offered a contract
by the government.
4.1 Regulation
Under asymmetric information, the government proposes a production and transfer scheme
(Qr(·), tr(·)) that entices the regulated firm to reveal its private information. By the rev-
elation principle, the analysis can be restricted to direct truthful revelation mechanism
where the firm reports its true cost β. To avoid the technicalities of ‘bunching’, we make
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the classical monotone hazard rate assumptions (see Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984; Jullien,
2000):
A2 G(β)/g(β) and (G(β)− 1) /g(β) are non decreasing.
Moreover in order to rule out corner solution in the sequel of the paper we focus on
not too convex demand function. That is,
A3 P ′′(Q)Q+ P ′(Q) < 0
Because regulation implies no ex-ante transfer of ownership, the use of a franchise fee
F is irrelevant. Under asymmetric information the government maximizes the utilitarian
welfare function:
max
{Q(·),t(·)}
EW = E [S(Q (β))− βQ (β)−K − λt (β)]
subject to
(d/dβ)Π(β,Q (β) , t (β) , 0) = −Q (β) (7)
(d/dβ)Q (β) ≤ 0 (8)
Π(β,Q (β) , t (β) , 0) ≥ 0 (9)
Conditions (7) and (8) are the first and second order incentive compatibility constraints
that entice the firm to reveal its private information β truthfully. Condition (9) is the
public manager’s participation constraint.15 This problem is a standard adverse selection
problem of regulation under asymmetric information (see Laffont and Tirole 1993). Under
assumption A3 it admits an interior solution. The optimal output, denoted Qr (β), solves
P (Q) +
λ
1 + λ
P ′(Q)Q = β +
λ
1 + λ
G(β)
g(β)
(10)
Under assumption A2 the output Qr (β) is non increasing in β so that condition (8) is
satisfied. Comparing equation (10) with equation (3), one can check that the output
15The public manager’s earnings are normalized to zero. Allowing a positive earning would reduce
further the attractiveness of regulation compared to outsourcing.
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level under symmetric information is obtained by setting the term G(β)/g(β) to zero.
Because the LHS of (10) decreases in Q, we deduce that the output level under asymmetric
information is lower than under symmetric information. In order to reduce the firm’s
incentive to inflate its cost report, the government requires high cost firms to produce less
than it would do under symmetric information. The distortion increases with λ.
We next turn to the computation of the regulated firm’s transfer. Integrating equation
(7) while using equation (9) the firm’s information rent is equal to
Πr (β) =
∫ β
β
Qr (β) dβ (11)
The firm with the highest cost β gets zero information rent: Πr
(
β
)
= 0. More efficient
firms get an informational rent. Substituting (11) into the definition of profit (1) yields
the regulated firm’s transfer
tr (β) =
∫ β
β
Qr (β) dβ − [(P (Qr(β))− β)Qr (β)−K] (12)
Larger investment costs raise the transfers to the regulated firm. The ex-ante welfare
writes as
EW r =
∫ β
β
[
S(Qr (β))− βQr (β)−K − λtr (β)
]
dG(β) (13)
The paper aims to study contracting arrangement that permits to deliver the com-
modity to consumers in the most efficient way. In what follow we study outsourcing as
an alternative to regulation.
4.2 Government Outsourcing
Under outsourcing the firm is managed by a private investor or entrepreneur. The timing
is the same as in the full information case, except that β is now private information. This
means that, the private firm firstly chooses to enter the market by paying the franchise fee
F and by investing K. If it enters, then nature chooses the marginal cost β according to
the distribution G(·). The private firm’s manager learns β while the government does not.
As in the regulation case the government proposes a set of incentive compatible contracts
15
(to(·), Qo(·)). The firm either chooses to commit with the government by picking a contract
and by implementing its terms, or it chooses not to contract with the government, in which
case it sets its production at the laissez-faire monopoly level. Production, exchange and
transfers occur as agreed upon.
Under outsourcing, the firm’s fallback position is given by its laissez-faire monopoly
profit, Πm (β), which has been derived in Section 3. It is not necessarily optimal to let
private monopoly operate at the laissez-faire level. The government may contract ex-post
with the firm in order to avoid the welfare loss associated with monopoly pricing. In this
case it subsidies the firm to produce more than its monopoly quantity. We firstly show
that only a fraction of firms signs a contract with the government and secondly that the
number of firms signing a contract decreases with the shadow cost of public funds.
4.2.1 Selective ex-post contracts
Let Qo (β) and Πo (β) denote the output and the profit of the private monopoly under
ex-post contracting. After entry, the franchise fee is sunk. Since it plays no role in the
quantity/price decision, we temporarily omit F . The government solves
max
{Q(·),t(·)}
EW = E [S(Q (β))− βQ (β)−K − λt (β)]
subject to
(d/dβ)Π(β,Q (β) , t (β) , 0) = −Q (β) (14)
(d/dβ)Q (β) ≤ 0 (15)
P (Q (β))Q (β)− βQ (β) + t (β) ≥ P (Qm (β))Qm (β)− βQm (β) (16)
Incentive compatibility constraints (14) and (15) are equivalent to (7) and (8). How-
ever, the private firm’s participation constraint (16) differs from the participation con-
straint under regulation (9). Under ex-post contracting, the minimum profit acceptable
to the firm is the operating profit it would get under laissez-faire. Subtracting K on both
sides of inequality (16), we can write the private firm’s participation constraint more
simply as
Π(β,Q (β) , t (β) , 0) ≥ pi(β,Qm (β))
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Contrary to regulation, the firm’s participation constraint (i.e., the RHS) now depends
on its type β.
The government is obliged to leave large rents to low cost firms if it wants to contract
with them. However it is not committed to compensate for the losses of high cost firms
because private investors endorse the full responsibility of their investments. The govern-
ment may then decide not to contract with high cost firms. This result is formally stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions A1 to A3 there exists a unique β0 ∈ [β, β] such that
β0 = min{β′0, β} where β′0 solves the equation
P [Qm (β)] = β + λ
G(β)
g(β)
(17)
Output and profit of the firm under ex-post contracting are equal to
Qo (β) =
 Qr (β) > Qm (β) if β < β0Qm (β) if β ≥ β0 (18)
Πo (β) =
 Πm (β0) +
∫ β0
β
Qr (β) dβ > Πm (β) if β < β0
Πm (β) if β ≥ β0
(19)
Proof. See Appendix 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 illustrates output and profit functions under regulation (thin curves), laissez-
faire (dashed curves) and ex-post contracting (bold curves). Under regulation and ex-post
contracting, low cost firms are enticed to claim larger subsidies by reporting higher cost
levels. The government alleviates this problem by imposing smaller output levels to the
firms that report high costs. Under regulation, the output distortion can be so strong that
the high cost firms may produce less than under laissez-faire. That is, Qr(β) ≤ Qm(β) for
all β ≥ β0. This does not occur under ex-post contracting because the fallback position
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of the government is the laissez-faire equilibrium. To understand this result consider the
firm with β = β0 so that Q
o(β0) = Q
r(β0) = Q
m(β0). There is no point to offer an ex-post
contract to this firm: its output level is the government’s preferred output level. Ex-post
contracting and laissez-faire yield the same consumer and producer surpluses. Consider
now a firm with β > β0. If the government proposes an ex-post contract to this firm it
is unable to get a surplus larger than under laissez-faire because incentive compatibility
obliges it to distort output down to Qr(β) < Qm(β). Moreover any transfer to this firm
also increases the subsidies to all firms having smaller costs. Because the government is
harmed by both effects, it offers no ex-post contract to firms with marginal cost β larger
than β0.
16
By virtue of equation (17) we have β0 → β when λ → ∞. That is, for very large
shadow costs of public funds, ex-post contracting is never optimal. Symmetrically, we
can define λ0 ≥ 0 as the shadow cost of public funds that yields the equality β0 = β:
λ0 = g(β)
[
P (Qm
(
β
)
)− β] . (20)
We deduce the following result.
Proposition 3 Let β0 and λ0 be defined equation (17) and (20).
(i) If λ ≤ λ0 all firms receive an ex-post contract under outsourcing (β0 = β).
(ii) If λ > λ0 a fraction G(β0) ∈ (0, 1) of firms receive an ex-post contract under out-
sourcing. This fraction decreases with λ and tends to zero when λ→∞.
Since the shadow cost of public funds tends to decrease with a country’s wealth, Propo-
sition 3 suggests that ex-post contracting is more likely to occur in developed economies.
16Note that if assumption A3 was not imposed, the demand function may generate a profit function
that is very convex for low β. The laissez-faire profit of a low cost firm could increase very rapidly as its
cost falls. As a consequence, a firm with intermediate cost level could want to mimic a lower cost firm
(instead of a higher cost firm). By doing so, this firm could claim to have high reservation profit and
receive the large compensation that is granted to the lower cost firm. The government would then need to
exclude low cost firms from the set of ex-post contracts. With type dependent participation constraints,
exclusion can affect both very high and very low types simultaneously (see Jullien 2000, Proposition 2).
For the sake of simplicity we rule out this case with Assumption A3.
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In developing countries outsourcing tends to take the extreme form of laissez-faire.
4.2.2 Transfers
We now study transfers under ex-post contracting. By the envelop theorem, we have
(d/dβ)Πm (β) = (∂/∂β)[P (Qm (β))− β]Qm (β) = −Qm (β). We deduce that
Πm (β) =
∫ β0
β
Qm (β) dβ +Πm (β0) =
∫ β
β
Qm (β) dβ +Πm
(
β
)
(21)
Combining (21) with (19) into the definition of profit (1) we get
to (β) =

∫ β0
β
[Qr (β)−Qm (β)] dβ
+[P (Qm (β))− β]Qm (β)− [P (Qr (β))− β]Qr (β)
if β < β0
0 if β ≥ β0
By construction, the transfer to (β) is non negative. On the one hand, high cost
firms with β ≥ β0 receive no transfer. The difference between the transfer under ex-
post contracting and regulation, to (β)− tr (β) , is thus equal to −tr (β). This difference is
positive if the government taxes the firm under regulation; it is negative if the government
subsidizes it. On the other hand, low cost firms with β < β0 receive a transfer that consists
of two positive terms: an information rent (the first line in the expression of to(β)) and
a subsidy to compensate for the fall in profits associated with the higher output levels
prescribed in the ex-post contracts (the second line in the expression of to(β)). Since
to (β) involves a difference between profits under regulation and under laissez-faire, the
terms with K cancel out. Therefore, in contrast to regulation, the government does not
compensate for the investment cost. The next lemma compares to (β) with the transfer
for regulated firms, tr (β), for low cost firms.
Lemma 4 Let ∆t(β) = to (β)− tr (β) . Then, for all β < β0,
∆t = Πm (β0)− Πr (β0) =
∫ β
β0
[Qm (β)−Qr (β)] dβ +Πm (β) (22)
19
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Expression (22) depends on threshold β0 but not on the firm’s type β. It includes
the profit of the private firm Πm(β0), which decreases with investment costs, and the
rent of the public manager Πr(β0), which, by (11), is independent of investment costs.
Hence, larger investment costs decrease the level of transfers under ex-post contracting
compared to regulation. Since Qm (β) > Qr (β) for all β > β0 (see Figure 1), the constant
∆t is positive if Πm
(
β
)
> 0. In this case the government pays larger transfers under
ex-post contracting than it would under regulation. Some firms receive positive transfers
whereas they would pay a tax under regulation (i.e., to (β0) = 0 > t
r (β0)). However, the
result can be reversed if Πm
(
β
)
is sufficiently negative (i.e., ∆t can be negative). The
government then pays smaller transfers under ex-post contracting than under regulation.
Some firms receive no transfers whereas they would be subsidized under regulation (i.e.,
to (β0) = 0 < t
r (β0)).
4.2.3 Welfare
By Lemma 2, expected welfare under ex-post contracting writes as
EW o (λ) =
∫ β0
β
W (β,Qr (β) , to (β) , F, λ) dG(β) (23)
+
∫ β
β0
W (β,Qm (β) , 0, F, λ) dG(β)
Using expression (22), the linearity of the welfare function W in t and F (see expression
(2)), and using Lemma 4 , we rewrite the expected welfare function as
EW o (λ) =
∫ β
β0
W (β,Qm (β) , 0, 0, λ) dG(β) (24)
+
∫ β0
β
W (β,Qr (β) , tr (β) , 0, λ) dG(β)− λ∆tG (β0) + λF
The ex-ante welfare consists of four elements: the welfare accrued to private firms with
high cost β receiving no ex-post contract, the welfare accrued to private firms with low
cost β that contract with the government to produce the regulated level output, the
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social cost of leaving the additional rent ∆t to the fraction G (β0) of firms under ex-post
contract, and finally the social value of the franchise fee.
The next section discusses the optimal choice between regulation and outsourcing.17
5 Regulation Versus Outsourcing
To facilitate the welfare comparison, we change the integration boundaries in expression
(24) so that we can write
EW o (λ) =
∫ β
β0
[W (β,Qm (β) , 0, 0, λ)−W (β,Qr (β) , tr (β) , 0, λ)] dG(β) (25)
+ EW r (λ)− λ∆tG (β0) + λF
Outsourcing is preferred to regulation if and only if EW o (λ)−EW r (λ) > 0. Using again
the linearity of W in t, this condition is equivalent to:∫ β
β0
[W (β,Qm (β) , 0, 0, λ)−W (β,Qr (β) , 0, 0, λ)] dG(β)
+ λ
[
F +
∫ β
β0
tr (β) dG(β)−∆tG (β0)
]  > 0 (26)
The difference in welfare between outsourcing and regulation is broken down into two
effects: the economic surplus effect (the first line of (26)), and the fiscal effect (the sec-
ond line of (26)). The fiscal effect is decomposed into three terms: the social value of
the franchise fee, λF , the social value of the reduction in subsidies to regulated firm,
λ
∫ β
β0
tr (β) dG(β), and the social cost of additional rents to private firms under outsourc-
ing, λ∆tG (β0). The sum of these three terms reflects the net saving in public funds that
outsourcing generates compared to regulation. The economic surplus effect is new. Under
outsourcing, low cost firms produce the same quantity than regulated firms but high cost
firms’ produce more (i.e., they produce the laissez-faire output). Higher production in
high cost realizations does not only raise consumer surplus but it also increases producer
surplus because high cost regulated firms produce below their monopoly optimal level.
17There is no need to compare laissez-faire with regulation. Ex-post contracting always dominates it.
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In what follows we show that the range of parameters for which outsourcing dominates
regulation is not empty. It turns out difficult to characterize the outsourcing decision for
all values of shadow costs of public funds without making specific assumptions about the
demand function and the cost distribution. Therefore, we firstly focus on the simpler
cases of small and large shadow costs of public funds. We then discuss the impact of
franchise fees on the outsourcing decision. Finally we present the full characterization of
the outsourcing decision in the case of linear demand and uniform cost distribution.
5.1 Small shadow costs of public funds
According to Proposition 3, the government offers an ex-post contract to all firms when
λ ≤ λ0. By (20), this is equivalent to set β0 = β. Since Πr
(
β
)
= 0 and G(β) = 1,
we deduce that ∆tG(β0) = Π
m
(
β
)
. The transfers under outsourcing are larger by an
amount equal to the laissez-faire profit in the worst cost realization. Moreover, by virtue
of Lemma 2, the quantities produced under regulation and under outsourcing are the
same when β0 = β. The economic surplus effect vanishes as the integral in expression
(25) cancels out. So, the choice between the two structures depends only on the fiscal
effect. More specifically, the ex-ante welfare is equal to
EW o (λ) = EW r (λ) + λ
(
F − Πm (β)) (27)
We deduce the following result.
Proposition 5 For λ ≤ λ0 outsourcing is preferred to regulation if and only if F >
Πm
(
β
)
.
It is instructive to break down the condition of Proposition 5 into the elements that
distinguish outsourcing from regulation, namely the timing, the franchise fee and the
outside option. First, the government saves the social cost of the investment λK. Second,
it recoups a franchise fee for a social value of λF . Finally, when λ ≤ λ0, the social cost of
the outside option under outsourcing is equal to the social value of the lowest profit under
laissez-faire, λ
[
P (Qm
(
β
)
)− β]Qm (β). Indeed, under outsourcing, the government gives
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to the private firm a rent that includes an information rent,
∫ β
β
Qr (β) dβ, on top of a
compensation for lowest outside option,
[
P (Qm
(
β
)
)− β]Qm (β). Under regulation, the
government gives the same information rent to the regulated firm, but it does not offer
any additional compensation to the public firm’s manager because her outside option is
zero.18 Therefore, the social cost of the outside option under outsourcing is equal to the
lowest profit level under laissez-faire. When this value is positive, firms receive larger rents
under outsourcing than under regulation. The reverse is true: when the lowest profit level
is negative, firms receive lower rents under outsourcing because the government is able to
avoid the social cost of subsidizing them in the worst cost realization.
Proposition 5 offers a sharp characterization of the optimal industrial policy. For low
values of shadow costs of public funds, which are more likely to be found in developed
countries,19 outsourcing is optimal as soon as the franchise fee collected by the govern-
ment is larger than the worst realization of laissez-faire profit. In particular, because
EΠm > Πm
(
β
)
, the government should outsource if the economic activity can be fran-
chised at its expected market price, F = EΠm. This point contrasts with Proposition
1, which established that, under symmetric information, the government is at best indif-
ferent between regulation and outsourcing if F = EΠm. More interestingly, even if the
government is not able/allowed to raise a franchise fee, it should outsource as long as the
firm make a loss with positive probability (i.e., Πm
(
β
)
< 0). In developed economies,
increasing returns to scale industries subjected to large technical uncertainty are then
good targets for outsourcing and ex-post contractual arrangement.
5.2 Large shadow costs of public funds
When the shadow cost of public funds is very large, private firms are never offered any
ex-post contracts. That is, β0 → β if λ→∞. The condition (26) then becomes equivalent
to F +
∫ β
β
tr∞(β)dG(β) > 0 where t
r
∞(β) = limλ→∞ t
r(β). We get the following result.
18Note again that assuming a strictly positive outside option would only favor the outsourcing regime.
19For instance, the shadow cost of public funds is assessed to about 0.3 in OECD countries while the
threshold λ0 is larger than 0.5 in the linear demand and uniform distribution example (see Section 5.4).
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Proposition 6 When λ → ∞, outsourcing is preferred to regulation if and only if F >
−E[tr∞(β)].
The interpretation of Proposition 6 is straightforward. When the shadow cost of public
funds is very large, the government puts an (infinitesimal) small weight on consumer
surplus and therefore focuses on extracting the maximal revenue from the regulated or
private firms. Outsourcing is preferred to regulation if and only if the government is
able to recoup more revenues through an ex-ante franchise fee than what it can extract
from a regulated firm through ex-post transfers. Note that when the government is not
able/allowed to collect a franchise fee (i.e. F = 0), Proposition 6 simply states that
outsourcing is preferred as soon as the government expects to subsidize the regulated
firm. The government abandons unprofitable markets to private investors and does not
intervene any longer.
Additional intuition can be obtained by breaking down the condition of Proposition
6 into the three elements that differentiate outsourcing from regulation. Indeed we can
write λ {F + E[tr∞(β)]} > 0 as
λ
{
F +K + E
[∫ β
β
Qr∞dβ
]
− E [(P (Qr∞)− β)Qr∞]
}
> 0
where Qr∞(β) = limλ→∞Q
r(β). As before, with outsourcing the government collects
the proceeds of the franchise fee (i.e. the first term), and it saves the social cost of
the investment (i.e. the second term). More interestingly, the government also gets the
opportunity to cut the subsidies that it expects to pay to the regulated firm; that is, the
information rent (i.e. the third term) minus the firm’s expected operational profit (i.e.
the last term). This decomposition makes clear that, for large costs of public funds, the
government does not care much about consumer surplus.20 It is not interested in correcting
production levels so that it never contracts ex-post with the private firm. Outsourcing is
thus socially valuable for high franchise fees, for large fixed costs and for expectations of
large subsidies to the regulated firm.
20Indeed, one can readily show that the regulated output Qr∞(β) is equal to Q
m (β +G(β)/g(β)), which
is smaller than the laissez-faire monopoly output Qm(β).
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5.3 Franchise fees
In this section, we study the role played by franchise fees in the outsourcing decision. We
first study the outsourcing decision when franchise fees are set exogenously. Let us denote
by EΠo0 the monopoly’s expected profit when no franchise fee is asked. It corresponds
to the maximal franchise fee that a risk-neutral private investor will ever agree to pay.
Using (19) and (21), we know that the profit under outsourcing is equal to the profit
under laissez-faire plus a positive information rent that is equal to
∫ β0
β
[Qr (z)−Qm (z)]dz
for each firm with β < β0. Using (11) and (12), this information rent can be written as
Πr(β) − Πr(β0) − [Πm(β) − Πm(β0)], which, by (22), is equal to Πr (β) − Πm (β) + ∆t.
Hence, the ex-ante profit with zero franchise fee is equal to
EΠo0 = EΠ
m +
∫ β0
β
∫ β0
β
[Qr (z)−Qm (z)]dzdG(β)
= EΠm +G(β0)∆t+
∫ β0
β
[Πr (β)− Πm (β)]dG(β) (28)
We add λEΠo0 on both sides of condition (26). After some substitutions and simplifi-
cations (see Appendix 3), the necessary and sufficient condition (26) becomes
λ [EΠo0 − F ] <

λ
∫ β
β
Πr (β) dG (β)
+λ
∫ β
β0
[
Πm (β)− [P (Qr (β))− β]Qr (β) +K
]
dG (β)
+
∫ β
β0
[W (β,Qm (β) , 0, 0, λ)−W (β,Qr (β) , 0, 0, λ)]dG(β).
(29)
Outsourcing is preferred to regulation if and only if the LHS is lower than the RHS.
The RHS includes the expected value of the public manager’s information rent (first
term), the additional profit (second term) and the additional surplus (third term) that
high cost firms generate under outsourcing. It is straightforward to check that each term is
positive. Indeed we have that EΠr (β) ≥ 0 and that Πm (β) = maxQ [P (Q)− β]Q−K ≥
[P (Qr (β))− β]Qr (β)−K. Finally the economic surplus effect is always positive because
Qm (β) ≥ Qr (β) for β ≥ β0 and because welfare is a decreasing function of output for
this range of parameters (indeed, both Qm (β) and Qr (β) are smaller than the output
under symmetric information as shown in equation (3)). We deduce the following result.
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Proposition 7 If the franchise fee F is sufficiently close to EΠo0, outsourcing is preferred
to regulation for any shadow cost of public funds λ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3
This proposition contrasts with Proposition 1 stating that regulation is always the best
policy under the symmetric information. Here outsourcing is strictly preferred to regula-
tion for any shadow cost of public funds if the government is able to tap a large enough
share of the ex-ante profit through the franchise fee. This is likely to occur when the
number of investors is large, when they do not collude and when there exist no informa-
tion asymmetry at the ex-ante stage. These conditions corresponds to perfectly efficient
procurement and financial markets. Moreover the possibility to successfully auction pub-
lic projects to private investors and entrepreneurs strongly depends on the government’s
ability to commit not to expropriate them once investments are sunk. This ultimately
depends on the credibility and on the stability of the political and judicial institutions.
Efficient financial markets, strong legal system and credible governments are found in de-
veloped economies. Such institutions are lacking in developing countries where attracting
private investors is difficult. In such countries, governments might be unable to tap a
large amount of private firms’ ex-ante profits. They might thus prefer regulation.21
Finally it is worth emphasizing that outsourcing can be preferred when the government
is not able/allowed to collect a positive franchise fee (i.e. when F = 0). From condition
(29), this situation arises when the private firm expects low profits and when the govern-
ment expects high information rents and strong output distortions in the regulated firm.
If profitability is low it is even possible that the government pays an up-front subsidy
(F < 0) to the private firm to entice it to enter and take the business risk. This is likely
to occur with large investment cost. Indeed the LHS of (29) decreases with K (through
the term EΠm in EΠo0) while the RHS is independent of it. Everything else being equal,
higher investment costs increases the benefits of outsourcing.
In the above discussion, we have considered exogenous franchise fees. However Propo-
21In contrast, strong moral hazard issues, time inconsitency and lack of governments’ economic focus
can be rationales for privatization in least developed countries (see Kornai et al. 2002).
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sition 7 shows that there is always room for negotiation as there always exists a franchise
fee that is accepted by the private investor and that makes the government prefer out-
sourcing. The negotiation should nevertheless be efficient in the sense that no economic
opportunities are lost during the bargaining process. This is formally stated in the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 8 Outsourcing is always preferred to regulation when the franchise fee F is
endogenously determined by an efficient bargaining process.
To clarify this result, let assume that the franchise fee is the Nash solution of the
bargaining process. The Nash bargaining solution is22
F φ = φEΠo0 − (1− φ) [EW o0 (λ)− EW r (λ)] /λ (30)
where EW o0 (λ) is EW
o (λ) evaluated at F = 0 and φ ∈ [0, 1] is the government’s bar-
gaining power. The franchise fee F φ can be positive or negative. It will be negative when
the government has weak bargaining power (i.e., when φ is close to zero) and/or when
expected profits are negative. When the market is not profitable the government is willing
to help a firm to enter. It subsidizes the sunk cost and proposes ex-post contracts. The
franchise fee will also be negative when the welfare level under regulation is sufficiently
small compared to the welfare level under outsourcing without franchise fee. In this sit-
uation the firm is able to extract an ex-ante rent from the government because it knows
that the option of regulation is not very attractive.
The results of this section rest on two key assumptions: first, risk neutral investors
have access to efficient financial markets and second, the government does not auction
the right to run the regulated firm to potential public managers. This last assumption is
usually justified by the fact that information rents take the form of in-kind benefits that
22The firms’s payoff is EΠo0 − F and its fallback position is 0. The government’s welfare
is decomposed into the social benefit of the franchise fee λF and EW o0 (λ) = EW
o (λ) − λF .
Its fallback position is regulation that yields EW r (λ). The Nash bargaining allocation solves
maxF [EW o0 (λ) + λF − EW r (λ)]φ [EΠo0 − F ]1−φ where φ ∈ [0, 1] is the government’s bargaining power.
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are difficult to trade. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that the government is able to
perfectly auction the right to operate a public-regulated firm to some risk neutral manager.
The government is then able to recoup the manager’s expected rents,
∫ β
β
Πr (β) dG (β) .
The ex-ante welfare associated with regulation is increased by this amount. This is equiv-
alent to cancel the first term in (29). Proposition 7 is still valid. Outsourcing is preferred
to regulation for any franchise fee F that is sufficiently close to EΠo0. The crucial assump-
tion of the paper is thus the existence of efficient financial markets. Here again policy
implications are more likely to fit developed economies.
5.4 Linear example
We have shown in Section 5.1 that outsourcing is preferred to regulation when the shadow
cost of public funds is lower than the threshold λ0 and when the firm makes a loss with a
positive probability. The practical relevance of this result depends on the value of λ0. In
addition, the above results suggest that outsourcing is more valuable for large investment
costs K (i.e., for low profitability market) and for large uncertainties about variable costs
β. We assess the relevance of these ideas by characterizing the outsourcing decision in the
case of linear inverse demand function P (Q) = a − bQ (a > 0 and b > 0) and a uniform
distribution of cost β that, without loss of generality, takes values in the interval [0, β].23
As a result, G(β) = β/β, and the hazard rate G(β)/g(β) = β so that assumption A1
simplifies to a ≥ 2β whereas assumption A2 is always satisfied. Assumption A3 always
holds with linear demand functions. It is straightforward to check that equation (17) yields
β0 = a/ (1 + 2λ) and equation (20) yields λ0 =
(
a− β) / (2β) so that λ0 ∈ [1/2,+∞).24
The shadow cost of public funds is assessed to be around 0.3 in industrial countries (see
for instance Snower and Warren, 1996). We conclude that if demand and cost functions
can reasonably be approximated by linear functions and satisfy assumption A1, which is
23With a linear demand, setting β larger than zero is equivalent to rescaling the intercept a to a− β.
24Let consider a risky project so that a = 2β and λ0 = 1/2. If the government chooses outsourcing, all
private firms receive an ex-post contract if λ ≤ 1/2. If λ > 1/2, the fraction of private firms that contract
ex-post with the government is equal to G(β0) = 2/ (1 + 2λ). For instance at λ = 0.9, 71% of the firms
get an ex-post contract and at λ = 2, only 40% receive it.
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an empirical issue, the threshold λ0 lies above the range of the shadow costs prevailing in
developed economies. It then seems plausible that outsourcing dominates regulation in
rather risky business in OECD countries.
Let V ≡ E[(P (Qm)− β)Qm] = (3a2−3βa+β2)/(12b) be the expected variable profit
of a laissez-faire monopoly (i.e., so that EΠm = V − K). Appendix 4 shows that the
welfare difference between regulation and outsourcing, EW r − EW o, is fully determined
by the parameters V , λ and F +K.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the demand is linear so that P (Q) = a − bQ and that the
cost is uniformly distributed over [0, β] so that a ≥ 2β. Then, there exist two thresholds
(m0,m1), 3/7 < m0 < m1 < 1, such that
(i) outsourcing is never preferred to regulation if (K + F )/V < m0.
(ii) outsourcing is always preferred to regulation if (K + F )/V ≥ m1.
(iii) otherwise, there exists a unique threshold λ1 (λ1 > λ0) such that outsourcing is
preferred to regulation if and only if λ ≤ λ1.
In addition, outsourcing is more likely to be preferred if β increases (i.e. m0 and m1
decreases and λ1 increases with larger β).
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Proposition 9 shows that outsourcing is more likely to be preferred to regulation for
lower shadow costs of public funds (smaller λ), for lower profitability (higher K/V ratio)
and for larger cost spreads (larger range [0, β]). To illustrate this proposition, Figure 2
depicts the relative levels of investment costs, K/V , above which outsourcing is preferred
to regulation. The first panel presents the case of a zero franchise fee (F = 0) whereas
the second panel presents the case of a franchise fee equal to half the ex-ante laissez-faire
profit (F = EΠm/2 = (V −K) /2). Curves are drawn for various cost spreads [0, β] where
β is equal to 0.10 ∗ a/2, 0.20 ∗ a/2, ... and a/2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
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We have already shown Section 5.3 that outsourcing is preferred to regulation when
the government is able to tap a large franchise fee from the monopoly. However, as
illustrated in Figure 2, this result is still robust when the government cannot extract a
franchise fee from the private sector. In other words, the outsourcing result does not hinge
on the government ability to collect franchise fees. It hinges on the existence of regulation
costs, captured here by information rents. Indeed, outsourcing is dominated for all values
of investment costs and for all costs of public funds when the cost spread tends to zero
(β → 0 = β). So, when there is no informational rent, regulation is optimal.25
6 Discussion
The paper has presented the conditions under which benevolent and utilitarian govern-
ments prefer to outsource a non-competitive economic activity to a private investor. This
section focuses on the economic content of these normative results. We first illustrate
the results by discussing different outsourcing cases according to their business contexts.
We study next the scope of the formal outsourcing contracts. We show that they can be
interpreted more broadly to include PPPs.
6.1 Outsourcing in practice
This paper shows that outsourcing is preferred for small shadow costs of public funds
(i.e., for rich countries). The non competitive activities that are more likely to yield a
social benefit if outsourced involve large cost spreads, i.e. large business risk, or relatively
low profitability (i.e., a relatively high K/V in Figure 2). It is worth noting that histor-
ically the earlier outsourcing contracts involved risky businesses such as exploration and
25One can thus check the continuity of the model as a function of the business risk under the uniform
cost distribution. Since g(β) = 1/β tends to infinity when the cost spread vanishes, λ0 also tends
to infinity so that all firms get subsidized. Proposition 5 hence applies and it is easily checked that
EW o (λ)− EW r (λ) ≥ λ [F −Πm (0)], which corresponds to the condition in Proposition 1.
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war.26 In very poor countries outsourcing takes the extreme form of laissez-faire. These
results have policy implications about ownership structure and contractual arrangements
in existing industries. We explore some of them in what follows.
Large business risk: A sector which has traditionally been organized with the type of
ex-post contractual arrangement described in the paper is the pharmaceutical industry.
It is a high-technology industry where the largest firms spend heavily on R&D (i.e., in
the US about 10% of their sales revenues according to the National Science Foundation,
17% according to the industry). The patent system confers a natural monopoly structure
on each niche of the industry. Yet, despite the monopoly structure and the safety and
externality concerns attached to drugs production and distribution, the pharmaceutical
industry is mostly owned and managed privately. A major difference between this industry
and other increasing-return-to-scale industries, such as public utilities, is uncertainty. Of
10000 pharmaceutical products patented, only 10 are marketed (OECD, 2000). With
such a low rate of success, the paper shows that it is optimal for governments to contract
ex-post with the private sector rather than to endorse ex-ante the full responsibility of the
investments through regulation or public ownership. The private firms have accordingly
much freedom in setting the prices of their patented products, while consumers’ access
to them is subsidized.27 The classification between reimbursed and non-reimbursed drugs
is consistent with the optimal outsourcing scheme. Only efficient types lead to ex-post
contractual agreement between the health insurances and the firms so that consumption
is higher than under laissez-faire. Less efficient drugs are left to the market.28
26For instance Queen Isabella of Spain outsourced exploration of the Western Ocean to an Italian con-
tractor in 1492; The British contracted for Hessian mercenaries to fight in America War of Independance
(see Savas 2005). Privateers are another example of contracting out of war at sea.
27In some countries, such as Germany, Norway, Finland, United-States or Canada, prices are free.
In the US pharmacies are unregulated and it is legal to purchase pharmaceutical via the internet. In
other ones, such as Australia, Belgium, France or Italy, prices of prescribed drugs are negotiated (but
not regulated) by government agencies because they are covered by public insurance. In average OECD
countries more than three-quarters of pharmaceutical expenditure is reimbursed in some way, usually by
a mix of public and private insurance, except in North-America (Jacobzone 2000).
28In practice there is a limit of outsourcing of risky projects because private firms are liable to default
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Low profitability: The analysis illuminates that outsourcing is socially beneficial for
activities that have a relatively low profitability (i.e., a relatively high K/V ). This result
suggests that outsourcing to the private sector of money-losing public services, such as
public services in low density areas, might be efficient. In remote, rural area the maximal
ex-ante franchise fee a private firm is willing to pay is generally negative (i.e., it is a
subsidy). The government is willing to contract out with the private sector as soon
as the subsidy it requires for the service is lower than the loss of running it publicly.
Examples include postal services outsourced to grocery stores and to gas stations in
Sweden, and in New Zealand. At the EU level most postal operators have hence been
restructuring their networks. They have usually closed the least profitable offices and
replaced them by franchised of retail outlets (see Nera 2004). Another example is public
transportation outsourced to local taxi companies in rural France (e.g. in Calvados, in
Haute-Garonne), in Switzerland (e.g., Geneva area), or in Canada (e.g. at Salaberry-de-
Valleyfield, or Victoriaville). For public transportation the EU commission has provided
subsidies to finance the development of such ”taxibus” services (Commission Europe´enne
2007). The type of contractual arrangements between the local government and the
private taxi companies is very close to the optimal ex-post contract derived in the paper.
The taxis get a public subsidy so that their profit is higher than under laissez-faire;
the users pay a modest fee (i.e., usually the price of a bus ticket). These outsourcing
solutions in low density areas are by far more cost and quality effective than standard
public transportation.
High franchise fees: Outsourcing is preferred to regulation for any shadow cost of
public funds if the government is able to tap a large enough share of the ex-ante profit
through the franchise fee. This might offer an explanation about the outsourcing policy
of water management in large French cities. Indeed in France water management in big
and bankruptcy. This is illustrated by the many cost overruns, delays and terminations in outsourced
public sector information and communication technologies (ICT) contracts in the UK (the fourth public
outsourcing area, see Kable, 2007). The social benefit of outsourcing is compromised when the can-
celed service or commodity is crucial to the government. The impact of firms bankruptcy on optimal
outsourcing contract is left for future research.
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cities is often outsourced to private companies in exchange of fees. Some cities, such as
Toulouse in 1990, have hence been able to liquidate their debt by contracting out their
water.29
Very poor countries: In very poor countries, governments are entirely focused on tax
collection. Since they cannot afford to subsidize private firms, outsourcing always takes the
extreme form of laissez-faire. It is chosen as soon as the ex-ante franchise fee paid by the
private sector is higher than the value of the expected transfers that can be extracted ex-
post from the public regulated firm. Consistent with our theory, utility services provision
is more market oriented in very poor countries than in OECD countries. For instance,
in Sub Saharan Africa, water and electricity services to the middle class and the poor
are often offered by private entreprises that are ready to invest to provide such services
without any subsidy (see Auriol and Blanc, 2008). Similarly transportation services in
African capital cities is almost entirely left to the private (informal) sector. Unregulated
minibuses and/or motorcycles organized in corporations (to control the routes and the
tarifs) are filling the service gap left by the public sector without any subsidy (Kumar and
Barrett, 2008). In light of the financial constraint faced by most African governments, it is
second best to let private providers serve freely the less profitable markets. Outsourcing is
even Pareto improving when it leads to the creation of an infrastructure or a service that
would have not existed otherwise. By contrast privatization of public firms’ profit centers
is suboptimal. In practice they have proven to be fiscally costly and highly unpopular.
6.2 Outsourcing contracts and PPPs
In this paper, outsourcing contracts have been assumed to be quite restricted in terms
of the details set out at the ex-ante stage. Before entry and investment, the government
and the firm commit to a contract with only two items: a franchise fee to be paid up-
29In 1990 the Compagnie Ge´ne´rale des Eaux (Veolia), paid some FF 500 millions to the city of Toulouse,
in addition to the FF 770 millions of debt of the public water operator, in exchange of the city water
concession. In 1995 a law was passed to ban entry fee in water concessions after several scandals of
corruption. Entry fees have since been replaced by annual renting fees.
33
front by the private investor and an ownership statement which implicitly makes void any
future claim by the government on the market outcome and structure. It is only after the
realization of the investment that the government eventually comes and reneges about
the market outcome by offering a more detailed ex-post contract or subsidy scheme.
There is however a second interpretation to our outsourcing contracts. Indeed, nothing
precludes the government to write the details of the future (state dependent) contract
or subsidy scheme within the initial contract that it signs with the outsourcing firm.
The detailed ex-ante contract includes three items: a franchise fee, a clause about the
firm’s unconditional right to operate in the market and a detailed description of a set of
payments contingent on the realization of output and/or technological uncertainties. Such
a contract is renegotiation-proof because, by the way it is designed, neither parties find it
profitable to make Pareto-improving offers after the realization of the private firm’s entry
and investment. The complexity of this initial contract resembles that of actual contracts
involved in public-private-partnerships (PPP) where much details are laid down before
the investment decision of the private party.30 In PPPs the private partner is supposed
to acquire or create an asset as well as to bear a significant share of the risk associated
with it in exchange for control and cash-flow rights (i.e. ownership). As recognized by the
literature, the transfer of some risk to the private partner is essential to create incentives to
behave efficiently (see Glaister, 1999). In addition, such transfer of risk is also consistent
with the accounting rules used by monitoring institutions. For example, Eurostat, the
Statistical Office of the European Communities, classifies the assets involved in public-
private-partnerships as non-government assets on the condition that the private partner
bears the construction risk, and either availability or demand risk (Eurostat, 2004). This
is precisely the line of modeling that we propose in this paper where the private firm bears
the full risk of its investment. The government is able to correct the market outcome either
ex-post by the use of subsidies or ex-ante by the writing of a detailed initial contract. To
30In 1992, John Major’s government introduced the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which aimed at
encouraging PPPs in the United Kingdom. The main focus of the program was on reducing the public
sector borrowing requirement, at least from official public records. Later on, Tony Blair’s government
shifted the emphasis of the PFI program to the achievement of ”value for money”.
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sum up, the essence of the outsourcing decision lies in the transfer of control and cash-flow
rights to a private investor, not in the level of details of the ex-ante contract. Ex-ante
contracts can be as straightforward as simple statements of transfer of franchise fee and
ownership or, equally, they can involve additional details about state contingent output
levels as in PPPs.
7 Conclusion
The paper studies a model of natural monopoly. A benevolent government maximizes
a utilitarian welfare function under adverse selection. We compare two regimes. In the
regulation regime, a public manager runs the firm’s operation. Because of information
rents, the government is not able to implement the first best solution. In the outsourcing
regime, the government abandons the control and cash-flow rights to a private entrepre-
neur who freely chooses its price and its output levels. The essence of the outsourcing
decision hence lies in the transfer of control and cash-flow rights to a private investor.
In the absence of government intervention this yields the monopoly laissez-faire solution.
The government can however propose ex-post contracts to increase production. The ex-
post contracts need to leave the private firm with at least its laissez-faire profit. We show
that the government chooses to offer ex-post contracts to low cost firms only. They are
subsidized to achieve the output level under regulation. In contrast, high cost firms do not
receive any contract. They operate under laissez-faire whenever it yields a higher output
than regulation. In practice the government is able to correct the market outcome either
ex-post by the use of subsidies or ex-ante by the writing of a detailed initial contract as
in public-private-partnerships.
Outsourcing generates two types of benefits. First, it prevents the government from
subsidizing money-losing firms. By the same token it forbids the government to tap
revenues from profitable ones. It also yields franchise fees that are extracted ex-ante.
Second it relaxes incentive compatibility constraint, which requires to reduce the output
of high cost firms. The importance of those benefits on the outsourcing decision depends
35
on the value of the shadow cost of public funds. When it is low, fiscal issues are not
important. The welfare function is tilted toward the consumer and producer surplus.
Outsourcing is then always preferred as long as the franchise fee is larger than the worst
laissez-faire profit. For larger values of the shadow cost of public funds outsourcing is
preferred if the franchise fee is large enough.
These normative results provide a useful grid to analyze outsourcing decisions and
public-private-partneships in practice. In advanced economies they suggest that out-
sourcing is more cost effective to deliver high technology products, such as pharmaceu-
tical products. They also suggest that outsourcing is more cost effective to cover low
profitability market segments of public utilities, such as postal or transportation services
in low density areas. In very poor countries, outsourcing, which takes the extreme form
of laissez-faire, is optimal in low profitability segments of natural monopolies. This is in
contrast to profitable segments that should be under public control.
Finally, we analyze a class of models with uniform cost distribution and linear demand
functions and we show that outsourcing dominates regulation for a large set of economic
parameters. Asymmetric information and governments’ financial constraint are important
costs for public management. These costs add to the internal efficiency costs analyzed in
the privatization literature and suggest that outsourcing is in many cases a better policy
than public ownership and regulation.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is an application of Jullien (2000) in the particular case of common value
adverse selection. We make it here explicit the dynamic programming approach. The
program can be written as
max
Q(.),Π(.),µ(.),γ(.)
∫ β
β
H1 (β,Q,Π, µ, γ) dβ
where
H1 (β,Q,Π, µ, γ) = [S (Q) + λP (Q)Q− (1 + λ) βQ− λΠ] g (β)
+ µ
( ·
Π+Q
)
+ λγ (β) (Π− Πm (β))
where Πm (β) ≡ [P (Qm(β))− β]Qm(β)−K, where µ (β) is the co-state variable of the in-
centive constraint and where γ (β) ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the participation con-
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straint. After integrating by part, this is equivalent to maxQ(.),Π(.),µ(.),γ(.)
∫ β
β
H2 (β,Q,Π, µ, γ)
dβ where
H2 (β,Q,Π, µ, γ) = [S (Q) + λP (Q)Q− (1 + λ) βQ− λΠ] g (β)
− ·µ (β)Π + µ (β)Q+ λγ (β) (Π− Πm (β))
with transversality conditions: Π
(
β
)
µ
(
β
)
= Π
(
β
)
µ
(
β
)
= 0. It is easy to check that
concavity conditions are respected. So, the following first order conditions ∂H2/∂Π = 0
and ∂H2/∂Q = 0 are also sufficient:
·
µ = λ (γ (β)− g (β))
P (Q) +
λ
1 + λ
P ′(Q)Q = β − µ (β)
Integrating both sides of the first equality yields µ (β) = λ (Γ (β)−G (β)) where Γ (β) =∫ β
β
γ (β) dβ. Since γ ≥ 0, Γ is a non decreasing function. By the transversality conditions,
µ
(
β
)
= µ
(
β
)
= 0, which implies that Γ
(
β
)
= 0 and Γ
(
β
)
= 1. Using this result in the
second equality gives
P (Q) +
λ
1 + λ
P ′(Q)Q = β +
λ
1 + λ
G (β)− Γ (β)
g (β)
(31)
By AssumptionA2 the RHS increases in β whereas the LHS decreases in β by Assumption
A3. Therefore the solution of (31) is a function l(β,Γ) that is non increasing in β.
Moreover, because the RHS decreases in (31), l(β,Γ) is a non decreasing function of Γ
(see ‘potential separation’ in Jullien, 2000). The solution is displayed as the bold curve
of Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Consider the binding participation constraint: Π(β) = Πm(β) and γ(β) > 0. A
necessary condition is that
·
Π(β) =
·
Πm(β) or, by the envelop theorem, Q(β) = Qm(β),
which is equivalent to l(β,Γ) = Qm(β).
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We study the intersection of Qm(β) with l(β,Γ) successively for Γ = 1 and for Γ = 0.
On the one hand, using expression (4), we find that l(β, 1) > Qm(β). So, l(β, 1) never
intersects Qm(β) and, thus, Γ (β) is never equal to 1. On the other hand, if l(β, 0)
intersects Qm(β), it must intersect at some β0 that satisfies both conditions (4) and (31),
which yields the expression (17) that we write again here:
P (Qm (β0))− β0 = λG(β0)
g(β0)
(32)
Under Assumptions A2 and A3, this equality accepts a unique solution β = β0. Indeed,
by Assumption A2, the RHS of (32) increases in β0. Also, note that the LHS of (32)
is positive and decreases in β0 iff P (Q
m (β)) − β is a decreasing function, or by (4), iff
P ′(Qm (β))Qm (β) is an increasing function. Since Qm is non increasing in β, this is true
under Assumption A3: P ′′Q+ P ′ < 0.
We thus have that, for β < β0, the solution of the program is Q
o (β) = l (β, 1) = Qr (β)
and γ(β) = 0, and that, for β ≥ β0, Qo (β) = Qm(β) = l (β, γ(β)) and γ(β) > 0. Also,
one can check that Qm (β) > Qr (β) iff β > β0.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 4
Let pi(β,Q) ≡ (P (Q)− β)Q−K. For any β < β0,
∆t = to (β)− tr (β)
=
∫ β0
β
[Qr (β)−Qm (β)] dβ + pi(β,Qm (β))− pi (β,Qr (β))
−
[∫ β
β
Qr (β) dβ − pi (β,Qr (β))
]
=
∫ β0
β
[Qr (β)−Qm (β)] dβ + pi(β,Qm (β))−
∫ β
β
Qr (β) dβ
=
∫ β0
β
Qr (β) dβ +Πm (β0)−
∫ β
β
Qr (β) dβ
= −
∫ β
β0
Qr (β) dβ +Πm (β0) = Π
m (β0)− Πr (β0)
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where we used (21) in the third and fourth equalities and (11) in the last equality. This
expression can be re-written as
∫ β
β0
[Qm (β)−Qr (β)] dβ +Πm (β) where the first term is
positive because Qm (β) > Qr (β) for all β > β0 (see proof of the Lemma 2).
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 7
We here detail the proof of condition (29). Let pi(β,Q) ≡ (P (Q)− β)Q − K. Adding
λ (EΠo0 − F ) on both sides of condition (26) we get
−λ∆tG (β0) + λEΠo0 + λ
∫ β
β0
tr (β) dG(β)
+
∫ β
β0
[W (β,Qm (β) , 0, 0, λ)−W (β,Qr (β) , 0, 0, λ)] dG(β)
 > λ (EΠo0 − F )
Replacing EΠo0 by it value in (28) and using the identity
∫ β
β0
tr (β) dG(β) =
∫ β
β0
[Πr (β)−
pi (β,Qr (β))] dG(β), the first line on the LHS becomes
λEΠm + λ
∫ β0
β
[Πr (β)− Πm (β)]dG(β) + λ
∫ β
β0
[Πr (β)− pi (β,Qr (β))] dG(β)
Adding the term λEΠr − λEΠm − λ ∫ β
β
[Πr (β)− Πm (β)] dG(β) (= 0), this expression
becomes
λEΠr + λ
∫ β
β0
[Πm (β)− pi (β,Qr (β))] dG(β
which yields the condition (29).
Appendix 4: Linear Example
We consider the linear inverse demand function P = a− bQ (a > 0, b > 0) and a uniform
distribution of cost β. Without loss of generality, we normalize β = 0 and for the sake
of convenience, we define α = 2β/a where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that indexes the
spread of cost distribution. Under those assumptions, we get that λ0 = (a − β)/(2β) =
(2− α) /(2α) and that V ≡ E [P (Qm(β))− β]Qm(β) =
(
3a2 − 3βa+ β2
)
/ (12b) =
(12− 6α+ α2) a2/ (48b). So, the expected operational profit V is proportional to a2/b.
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One can readily show that expected welfare is also proportional to a2/b. This allows us to
simplify computations by normalizing the investment cost and the franchise fee such that
k = K/V and f = F/V . So, EΠm/V = 1−k. We compute that welfare under regulation
is equal to
EW r
V
= 2
12 (1 + λ)2 + α2 (1 + 2λ)2 − 6α (λ+ 1) (2λ+ 1)
(12− 6α+ α2) (1 + 2λ) − (1 + λ) k
and that welfare under outsourcing is equal to
EW o
V
=

24+36λ−12α(1+2λ)+α2(λ+2)(1+2λ)
(12−6α+α2)(1+2λ) − k + λf if λ < λ0
8+3α(α2−6α+12)(2λ+1)2
2α(12−6α+α2)(1+2λ)2 − k + λf if λ ≥ λ0
Comparing those two expressions, we get that EW o ≥ EW r if and only if
k + f ≥ m(λ, α) ≡
 m0 if λ < λ0m0 + α412−6α+α2 (λ−λ0)3λ(α(λ−λ0)+1)2 if λ ≥ λ0
where m0 ≡ 3 (2− α)2 / (12− 6α+ α2) lies in the interval [37 , 1]. One can readily show
that the second term in the last expression is an increasing function of λ for λ ≥ λ0.
Therefore m(λ, α) increases in λ for λ ≥ λ0. Also, we note that limλ→∞m(λ, α) =
m1 ≡
[
3 (2− α)2 + α2] / (12− 6α+ α2), which is larger than m0 and lies in the interval
[4
7
, 1]. As a result, the function m(λ, α) (weakly) increases with λ. So, we can readily
conclude (i) that outsourcing is never prefered to regulation if k + f < m0, (ii) that, if
k + f ∈ [m0,m1) there exists a unique threshold λ1 (λ1 > λ0), such that outsourcing is
prefered to regulation if and only if λ ≤ λ1, and (iii) outsourcing is always prefered to
regulation if k + f ≥ m1.
Finally, one can further show that m0 and m1 are decreasing functions of α. In
addition, for λ ≥ λ0, we get
∂
∂α
m(λ, α) = −12
 4α2 (6− 6α+ α2) (λ− λ0)3 + 2α (36− 36α+ 10α2 − α3) (λ− λ0)2
+2 (6− α) (2− α) (3− α) (λ− λ0) + (6− α) (2− α)2 α−1

α2 (12− 6α+ α2)2 (1 + 2λ)2 λ
which is negative because α ∈ [0, 1]. As a consequence, m(λ, α) is a decreasing function
of α. This means that outsourcing is more likely to be preferred if α increases; that is, if
β increases.
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Figure 1:  Output and Profit under Regulation, Laissez-Faire and Outsourcing. 
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Figure 2:  Outsourcing v/s Regulation in the Linear Model 
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Figure 3:  Output levels and shadow value of participation constraint Γ(β) 
